Background. Despite the introduction of an effective serogroup A conjugate vaccine (MenAfriVacä), sporadic epidemics of other Neisseria meningitidis serogroups remain a concern in Africa. Polyvalent meningococcal conjugate (PMC) vaccines may offer alternatives to current strategies that rely on routine infant vaccination with MenAfriVac plus, in the event of an epidemic, district-specific reactive campaigns using polyvalent meningococcal polysaccharide (PMP) vaccines. Methods. We developed an agent-based transmission model of N. meningitidis in Niger to compare the health effects and costs of current vaccination practice and 3 alternatives. Each alternative replaces MenAfriVac in the infant vaccination series with PMC and either replaces PMP with PMC for reactive campaigns or implements a one-time catch up campaign with PMC for children and young adults. Results. Over a 28-year period, replacement of MenAfriVac with PMC in the infant immunization series and of PMP in reactive campaigns would avert 63% of expected cases (95% prediction interval 49%-75%) if elimination of serogroup A is not followed by serogroup replacement. At a PMC price of $4/dose, this would cost $1412 ($81-$3510) per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted. If serogroup replacement occurs, the cost-effectiveness of this strategy improves to $662 (cost-saving, $2473) per DALY averted. Sensitivity analyses accounting for incomplete laboratory confirmation suggest that a catch-up PMC campaign would also meet standard cost-effectiveness thresholds. Limitations. The assumption that polyvalent vaccines offer similar protection against all serogroups is simplifying. Conclusions. The use of PMC vaccines to replace MenAfriVac in routine infant immunization and in district-specific reactive campaigns would have important health benefits and is likely to be cost-effective in Niger. An additional PMC catch-up campaign would also be costeffective if we account for incomplete laboratory reporting.
The meningitis belt, a region in sub-Saharan Africa with an estimated population of 430 million people, is prone to sporadically occurring meningitis epidemics. [1] [2] [3] These epidemics place a heavy burden on national and local resources, 4 resulting in substantial deaths and long-term disabling sequelae. 5 The largest of these epidemics caused an estimated 250,000 cases with more than 25,000 deaths in 1996. 6, 7 For the past 30 years, control of meningitis epidemics in this region has relied on reactive vaccination campaigns using polysaccharide vaccines in districts where the weekly meningitis incidence passes a critical incidence threshold of 10/100,000 population. 4, 8, 9 While this strategy, when deployed early in an epidemic, could save lives, it has not reduced the frequency and magnitude of epidemics because 1) polysaccharide vaccines induce only short-term protection (especially in children) 4, 10, 11 and 2) the successful implementation of reactive vaccination campaigns is hampered by significant delays between outbreak identification and vaccination responses. 12, 13 The introduction of a Neisseria meningitidis serogroup A conjugate meningococcal vaccine (PsA-TT, MenAfriVacä) in the African meningitis belt in 2010 to 2011 has reduced meningitis A carriage and cases to an exceptionally low level. 3, [14] [15] [16] [17] Despite the early success of MenAfriVac in the prevention of meningitis A epidemics, other non-A serogroups continue to cause epidemics of meningitis. 9, [18] [19] [20] [21] Examples include the N. meningitidis serogroup W epidemic in Burkina Faso (2012) 22 ; the N. meningitidis serogroup X epidemics in Burkina Faso (2010), Niger (2006) , and Togo (2009) 23, 24 ; a recent severe epidemic by a novel strain of N. meningitidis serogroup C (NmC) in Niger (2015) 25, 26 ; and the largest ever recorded epidemic of NmC in Nigeria (2017) with more than 14,000 suspected cases. 26, 27 To combat the remaining threat from non-A meningococcal serogroups, polyvalent vaccines that target C, Y, W, and X serogroups (in addition to A) are being considered for use in Africa. 12, 21, 25, 28, 29 In contrast to the available polyvalent meningococcal polysaccharide (PMP) vaccines, polyvalent meningococcal conjugate (PMC) vaccines are immunogenic in young children and induce longer-term (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) year) protection and, hence, can also be used in reactive and/or mass preventive vaccination campaigns 2, [30] [31] [32] as well as in the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI).
A recent cost-effectiveness analysis in Burkina Faso suggests that a vaccination strategy that involves a catchup nationwide vaccination campaign in young adults with PMC vaccine and the addition of this vaccine to EPI (as a replacement for MenAfriVac) will likely be cost-effective compared with the current World Health Organization (WHO) strategy of reactive vaccination using PMP vaccines. 33 Yet the evidence to inform the best use of these novel polyvalent meningococcal vaccines for other countries of the meningitis belt is lacking. Despite similarities in certain characteristics of meningococcal epidemics across countries of meningitis belt, 10, 29 the difference in population sizes and structures, age distribution of meningococcal cases, and carriage prevalence may affect the performance of vaccination strategies from one setting to another. 17 In this study, we describe a district-level, agent-based model (ABM) of meningococcal transmission in Niger. While Niger has a similar total population size as Burkina Faso, the population density of Niger is considerably lower (with the largest concentrations of individuals in southwestern districts), and Niger has experienced less severe meningococcal epidemics since 2002. As vaccination programs may offer relatively smaller health gains in settings with less severe meningococcal epidemics, the evaluation of PMC vaccination strategies in Niger, and comparison with previously reported results from Burkina Faso, will shed light on how the local epidemiology of disease affects the projected health impact and costs associated with alternative vaccine strategies.
Methods

An Agent-Based Model of Meningococcal Transmission in Niger
Our ABM is a stochastic, and spatially explicit model [34] [35] [36] to describe the meningococcal transmission across 44 districts of Niger (Figure 1 and Supplementary Figure S2 ). Meningitis epidemics in Niger (along with other countries of meningitis belt) occur sporadically and, when they do occur, are of greatly varying severity ( Figure 2 ). 21, 37, 38 This suggests that a stochastic model can best simulate the types of chance events that ultimately lead epidemic takeoff or fade out after the appearance of meningitis cases within a district.
Capturing meningococcal epidemics at the district level is necessary to model reactive vaccination campaigns that are triggered when districts exceed the WHO epidemic threshold of 10 per 100,000 population in a week. 4 belt 20,33,39-41 but allows for additional flexibility to represent complex vaccination strategies and the sequential timing of events experienced by individuals. In contrast to compartmental models in which the change in size of each compartment is tracked over time, ABMs track each population member separately. For our study, this allows us to 1) model the variation in cost and health outcome across individuals and 2) more accurately describe the individual-level impact and population-level implementation of vaccine strategies (as described below).
In our ABM, individuals are assumed to be in 1 of 4 health states at any given time: susceptible, carrier, meningitis, and immune ( Figure 1 ). Susceptible individuals are at dynamic, age-specific risk of infection with N. meningitidis that is proportional to the prevalence of invasive meningitis and carriage. Infected individuals move to an asymptomatic but infectious state (''carrier''), where they may develop invasive meningitis disease (''meningitis'') or lose their carriage status and develop immunity (''immune''). The rate of progression to the active disease is highest at the time of infection and decreases gradually over time such that only a small portion (about 1%) of carriers eventually develop meningitis. Individuals who lose their carriage state or recover from meningitis will develop immunity against reinfection. The duration of this immunity is assumed to be shorter for those who acquired their immunity through the loss of carriage state compared with those who become immune after recovering from meningitis disease. We also assume that the probability of superinfection while in the carriage state is negligible. Further details about the model assumptions and parameters as well as the demographics of Niger are provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
Data Sources
To parameterize our model, we used an anonymized data set of all documented clinical meningitis cases in Niger from 2002 to mid-2015 (provided by the Ministry of Health, Niger). The data set contains sample date, district, age, and the final clinical diagnosis for 29,349 clinical cases. To use this data set to calibrate our simulation model, we categorized each reported meningitis case into 1 of 6 mutually exclusive groups based on the final clinical diagnosis ( Table 1 ). For reported cases in which laboratory typing was not completed (n = 5089), we use empirical distributions of the serogroup distribution of each epidemic season to assign a meningitis type, assuming that these case designations were missing at random. Using this data set, we estimated the weekly N. meningitidis cases by serogroup and age group within districts of Niger, which was then used to calibrate our model (see below).
Analyzing this data set shows that in districts where epidemics were detected between 2002 and 2015, the majority of reported cases did not have a conclusive bacteriological diagnosis and were recorded as bacteriologically negative (Supplementary Figure S6 in the Appendix). Given the imperfect sensitivity of diagnostics, there is likely to be underreporting of meningococcal cases in this data set, as most meningitis cases (.79%) in epidemic years 2006 to 2008 were caused by N. meningitidis. 18 Our projections of the cost-effectiveness of meningococcal vaccination strategies could underestimate the health benefits from vaccination programs if bacteriologically confirmed cases significantly undercount the true burden of meningococcal meningitis. To account for this possibility, we consider 2 scenarios: 1) a conservative scenario that assumes all meningococcal cases occurred in Niger from 2002 to mid-2015 are reported in our data set and correctly categorized and 2) an alternative scenario that assumes meningitis cases confirmed as N. meningitidis in our data set represent only half of all meningococcal cases occurring in Niger during this period. We report the results of our cost-effectiveness analysis under both scenarios.
Strain-Replacement Scenarios
While the introduction of MenAfriVac has dramatically lowered the incidence of serogroup A in Niger, 14, 17, 42 the possibility of serogroup A being replaced by other serogroups in the future still exists, 18, 19, 21 as evidenced by yearly outbreaks and a severe epidemic caused by a novel strain of serogroup C (NmC) in Nigeria in 2013 to 2015 and the largest ever recorded epidemic of NmC in Nigeria in 2017. 26 As such, consistent with a similar costeffectiveness study conducted for Burkina Faso, 33 we consider 2 extreme scenarios to quantify the impact of serogroup A replacement on the performance of vaccination strategies ( Figure 2 ): 1) ''complete strain replacement,'' which assumes that future epidemics will occur with similar frequency and magnitude as observed in Niger between 2002 and mid-2015, and (2) ''no strain replacement,'' which assumes that the future will be similar to the past with serogroup A excluded. These 2 extreme scenarios bound the performance of vaccination strategies and allow us to investigate how robust the cost-effectiveness of vaccination strategies is with respect to the possibility of future strain A replacement.
Model Calibration
We calibrated our ABM to capture the key characteristics of meningococcal epidemics under both strain replacement scenarios, including the age distribution of meningococcal incidence ( Figure 3A ), average carriage prevalence among different age groups ( Figure 3B ), and weekly average incidence of meningococcal cases ( Figure  3C ) between 2002 and mid-2015 (the full duration of the available time series). We used the cosine of the angle (u) between the vectors of Fourier amplitude for observed and simulated time series of weekly meningococcal cases to measure how well the simulated trajectories match the periodicity of past meningococcal epidemics in Niger ( Figure 3D ). Figure 4 displays the time series of meningococcal cases from 3 simulated trajectories over 30 years produced by the calibrated model in comparison with the meningococcal time series observed in Niger during 2002 to 2015. We emphasize that our goal is not to fit to the timing of past epidemics but instead to calibrate the model against the periodicity of past epidemics in additional to calibration targets depicted in Figure 3 . Details of our calibration approach are described in the Supplementary Appendix. Figure 5 suggests that our model behavior is consistent with the observed data on the N. meningitidis cases for all districts of Niger between 2002 and mid-2015. Reactive campaigns are launched in districts where weekly clinical meningitis incidence (which include not only confirmed meningococcal cases but also suspect cases of Haemophilus influenzae types b and non-b, and Streptococcus pneumoniae) exceeds the WHO epidemic threshold of 10 per 100,000 population. 12, 33 Supplementary Figure S9 in the Appendix confirms that our model's behavior at the district level is consistent with the observed data of clinical meningitis cases on the number of years from 2002 to mid-2015, where each Niger district passes the WHO epidemic threshold.
Modeling the Impact of Vaccination
In our simulation model, we track the vaccination status of each individual by agent-level attributes. If individuals are vaccinated in the susceptible state, their susceptibility to infection is reduced according to the effectiveness of the administered vaccine ( Table 2 ). Vaccinated carriers are assumed to remain infectious but are protected from progression to the invasive disease for the duration of immunity offered by the vaccine. For those vaccinated while in the immune state, if the natural immunity wanes sooner than the vaccine immunity, they proceed to the susceptible state but remain partially protected against infection as long as the vaccine immunity lasts. We further assume that individuals with active meningitis are not eligible for vaccination, those vaccinated with PMP will become reeligible for vaccination at the beginning of the next epidemic season, and those vaccinated with PMC will become vaccine eligible 10 years after the time of vaccination.
Alternative Vaccination Strategies
We estimate the cost and health outcomes of 4 vaccination strategies that differ by the types of vaccines used (MenAfriVac, PMP, and PMC), the targeted age groups, and the vaccination programs (routine, reactive, and preventive) to immunize the population ( Table 2 ). These policies are consistent with those considered in a recent cost-effectiveness study conducted for Burkina Faso. 33 The Base strategy represents the current WHO strategy of using PMP vaccines in reactive campaigns in districts in which the weekly meningitis incidence passes the threshold of 10 cases per 100,000 population. As PMC vaccines offer protection against multiple serogroups (as opposed to MenAfriVac that induces immunity only against serogroup A) and have better immunogenicity properties compared with PMP (Table 3) , the Base strategy can be improved by replacing MenAfriVac in routine EPIs and PMP in reactive campaigns with PMC vaccines. This corresponds to the Base Prime strategy in Table 3 . Prevention 1 and 2 strategies immunize younger adults through mass nationwide immunization campaigns in addition to using PMC vaccines in EPI. We note that while the Base Prime strategy attempts to control district-level outbreaks, the 2 prevention strategies use nationwide campaigns to reduce the risk of infection and to potentially achieve herd immunity. We assume that preventive campaigns occur in November of the first simulation year and are completed before the start of the next epidemic season.
For reactive campaigns in Base and Base Prime strategies, once an epidemic is declared in a district, the time until the initiation of a reactive campaign is assumed to follow a discrete uniform distribution of [2, 10] weeks. 33 Once triggered, reactive campaigns are assumed to continue until the end of the current season (although the majority of the district's population will Figure S9 show that trajectories generated by our model also match other key properties of meningococcal epidemics in Niger (e.g., age distribution of cases, age-specific carriage prevalence, average weekly meningococcal incidence at the national and district level, and number of districts in each year between 2002 and 2015 in which the threshold of 10 meningitis cases per 100,000 population is exceeded). get vaccinated within a few weeks after the vaccines are delivered).
Health and Financial Outcomes
We use disability-adjusted life-years (DALY) to measure the health outcomes associated with vaccination strategies. To measure the financial outcomes (presented in US dollars), we consider disease-related costs incurred due to meningitis case management and care for patients who experience sequelae as well as costs of implementing vaccination campaigns. As the government and donors primarily bear the vaccination program costs in Niger, we adopt the payer's perspective in conducting costeffectiveness analysis. All health and financial outcomes of alternative vaccination strategies are presented with respect to the Base strategy (Table 3) and are discounted at an annual rate of 3% to 2016. Assumptions and details for health, financial outcomes, and DALY calculations are provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
We followed the Consolidated Health Economic Evaluation Reporting Standards (CHEERS) 55 to report the results of our cost-effectiveness analysis study. CHEERS was developed by the ISPOR Health Economic Evaluation Publication Guidelines Good Reporting Practices Task Force with the objective of optimizing the reporting of health economic evaluation studies. We present all estimates from the model as the average and 95% prediction intervals (the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles) of 200 trajectories simulated over a 28-year period. We found that obtaining additional trajectories does not meaningfully change the bounds of the prediction intervals (see Supplementary Figure S11 ). PMC, polyvalent meningococcal conjugate; PMP, polyvalent meningococcal polysaccharide. a. These parameters are sampled for each individual in a simulated trajectory. All other parameters are sampled once per simulated trajectory. b. Vaccine uptake for routine vaccination is assumed to be equal to the 9-month measles coverage. 51 Figure 5 Average weekly N. meningitidis cases in Niger's districts produced by our model and observed in the data for the complete-strain-replacement scenario. See Supplementary Figure S10 in the Appendix for the fit of the model under the scenario of no strain replacement.
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Results
Replacing both MenAfriVac in routine EPIs and PMP in reactive campaigns with PMC vaccines (Base Prime strategy) results in a 62% (46%-77%) and 63% (49%-75%) reduction in the annual meningococcal cases expected under the Base strategy for complete-strain-replacement and no-strain-replacement scenarios, respectively ( Figure   6 ). This improvement is associated with superior immunogenicity of PMC vaccines compared with PMP vaccines ( Table 2 ). Both Base and Base Prime strategies rely on reactive campaigns to respond to epidemics, and hence their performance would be impaired by logistical delays in the launch of these campaigns once the epidemic threshold is passed in a district. Our model shows that proactive strategies (i.e., Prevention 1 and 2) that aim to immunize young adults in mass vaccination campaigns avert the largest number of meningococcal cases: Prevention 1 averts 74% (54%-99%) and 74% (58%-99%) of cases, and Prevention 2 averts 79% (57%-99%) and 79% (60%-99%) of cases with respect to the Base strategy under complete-strain-replacement and no-strain-replacement scenarios. Our model suggests that none of these strategies results in elimination of N. meningitidis, and the meningococcal epidemics may recur if reintroduction occurs after the herd immunity achieved through mass vaccination campaigns wanes. Figure 7 shows the expected number of vaccines required for each vaccination strategy. Base and the Base Prime strategies have the highest and the lowest expected annual consumption of total vaccine doses, respectively, under both strain-replacement scenarios. For the Base strategy, the wide prediction intervals of the estimated number of PMP vaccines used are due to the sporadic district-level outbreaks that may trigger reactive campaigns in the affected districts. Since routine programs target 9-month-old infants, extending the vaccination projection horizon does not affect the estimated annual consumption of MenAfriVac, PMP, or PMC vaccines in routine programs. However, the extended horizon reduces the estimated annual consumption of PMC vaccines in reactive and preventive campaigns. This is because preventive campaigns are implemented only once at the beginning of the projection period.
We estimate the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of the Base Prime strategy with respect to the a. If the district-level epidemic threshold is exceeded, a reactive campaign using PMC vaccines would be initiated in the district. Figure 6 Expected percentage reduction in annual meningococcal cases over a 28-year simulation period for the vaccination strategies described in Table 3 compared with the Base strategy. Bars represent the 95% prediction intervals.
Base strategy to be $662 (Cost-saving to $2473) and $1412 ($81 to $3510) for scenarios with and without strain A replacement. Per WHO recommendations, strategies that avert 1 DALY for less than 3 times the per capita gross domestic product are considered cost-effective. 56 Hence, at the cost-effectiveness threshold of $1077, 3 per capita gross domestic product of Niger in 2015, 57 the Base Prime strategy is expected to be cost-effective with respect to the Base strategy under the complete-strain-replacement scenario. The ICER of Prevention 1 and 2 strategies is estimated to be above this cost-effectiveness threshold ( Table 4 ). Prevention 1, however, remains a viable alternative as it is expected to cost $984 (Cost-saving to $2964) and $1779 ($516 to $4007) per DALY averted with respect to the Base strategy under with and without strain A replacement scenarios (Figure 8A, B) . Figure 8C , D compare the impact of vaccination strategies on the population's net monetary benefit (NMB) for varying values of the cost-effectiveness threshold (v). The expected gain in NMB for a strategy with respect to Figure 7 Expected number of vaccines used per year (over a 28-year simulation period). (A) Complete-strain-replacement scenario. B) No-strain-replacement scenario. We note that preventive campaigns are implemented only once at the beginning of the projection period. Error bars represent 95% projection intervals (error bars that are shorter than the width of symbols are not shown). PMP, polyvalent meningococcal polysaccharide; PMC, polyvalent meningococcal conjugate. the Base strategy is calculated as: v 3 (additional DALYs averted by the strategy) -(additional cost of the strategy). Prevention 1 and 2 demonstrate similar performance under both strain-replacement scenarios and the incremental benefit from all strategies are slightly larger when strain A elimination is followed by complete strain replacement ( Figure 8 and Table 4 ). The cost-effectiveness analysis results presented above (and in Figure 8 and Table 4 ) assume that all meningococcal cases that occurred from 2002 to mid-2015 in Niger are reported and correctly diagnosed in the patient-level data set we used to calibrate our model. As demonstrated in Supplementary Figure S6 , this is a very conservative assumption and could lead to substantial underestimation of health benefits from meningococcal vaccination strategies. Under an alternative scenario that only 50% of cases caused by N. meningitidis are correctly diagnosed in our data set ( Supplementary   Figure 8 Economic evaluation of vaccination strategies described in Table 3 for the complete-strain-replacement scenario (A, C) and the no-strain-replacement scenario (B, D). The price of the polyvalent meningococcal polysaccharide and polyvalent meningococcal conjugate vaccines is $4 per dose (see the Supplementary Appendix for sensitivity analysis to the vaccine prices). In C and D, the expected gain in net monetary benefit of a strategy is calculated with respect to the Base strategy. The dashed line in these figures represents the cost-effectiveness threshold of 3 per capita gross domestic product of Niger, which was estimated to be 1077 USD in 2015. 57 Figure S6 ), we estimate the cost-effectiveness ratios for Base Prime, Prevention 1, and Prevention 2 strategies with respect to the Base strategy at $395 (Cost-saving to $1237), $563 (Cost-saving to $1482), and $611 (Cost-saving to $1537) under complete strain replacement and at $795 ($41 to $1755), $986 ($258 to $2003), and $1046 ($317 to $2159) under no strain replacement ( Figure 9 ). As expected, under this scenario, the cost-effectiveness of the preventive catch-up vaccination strategies improves.
Additional sensitivity analysis shows that the costeffectiveness of Base Prime and Prevention 1 and 2 strategies diminishes as the price of the PMC vaccine increases (Supplementary Figure S14 ). If the PMC vaccine price is $10 per dose, we estimate the cost-effectiveness ratios for Base Prime, Prevention 1, and Prevention 2 strategies with respect to the Base strategy at $3539 ($1631-$6430), $3988 ($1932-$7455), and $4139 ($2139-$7677) under complete strain replacement and at $5208 ($2570-$9326), Figure 9 Economic evaluation of vaccination strategies described in Table 3 for the complete-strain-replacement scenario (A, C) and the no-strain-replacement scenario (B, D) for the scenario in which only 50% of meningococcal cases are reported and correctly categorized. The price of polyvalent meningococcal polysaccharide and polyvalent meningococcal conjugate vaccines are $4 per dose. In C and D, the expected gain in net monetary benefit of a strategy is calculated with respect to the Base strategy. The dashed line in these figures represents the cost-effectiveness threshold of 3 per capita gross domestic product of Niger, which is estimated to be $1077 USD in 2015. 57 $5809 ($3010-$10,272), and $6017 ($3223-$10,608) under no strain replacement.
Discussion
The current WHO-recommended strategy for meningitis control in sub-Saharan Africa relies on using MenAfriVac in the EPI and PMP vaccines in districts where the epidemic threshold is passed. Our results indicate that once affordable PMC vaccines become available for Africa, this currently recommended strategy could be improved by alternative policies that rely on using PMC vaccines. A strategy that uses PMC vaccines in the EPI and in reactive vaccination programs could offer a substantial improvement in reducing the meningococcal epidemics burden and is likely to be costeffective at the PMC vaccine price of $4 or lower per dose. This strategy, however, still leaves the district at risk of sporadic outbreaks. Augmenting this strategy with the addition of nationwide mass vaccination campaigns to immunize 1-to 18-year-olds with PMC vaccines could avert the majority of meningococcal cases. The cost-effectiveness of vaccination strategies that use the PMC vaccine is improved if elimination of serogroup A is followed by a strain replacement. Accounting for incomplete laboratory confirmation also improves the cost-effectiveness of PMC vaccination, including catchup campaigns.
A major strength of our study was the availability of a rich, individual-level data set of more than 29,000 reported meningitis cases in Niger between 2002 and mid-2015. The availability of age, district, and final diagnosis (due to N. meningitidis serogroups as well as H. influenzae type b and S. pneumoniae) for reported cases allowed us to calibrate our model against key properties of meningococcal epidemics in Niger. Our model demonstrates the ability to accurately describe the age distribution of meningococcal cases and carriage prevalence as well as the discrete-level magnitude and frequency of meningitis activity. Moreover, while our model shares a similar structure to the existing compartmental models of African meningitis, 20, 33, 39, 40, 58 the use of an ABM approach allowed for more accurate representation of disease natural history and evaluation of different vaccination strategies.
One of the limitations of our study stems from the assumption that polyvalent vaccines offer the same degree of protection against all serogroups. This assumption is consistent with existing models that aggregate serogroups into ''vaccine'' and ''nonvaccine'' type 33, 40, [59] [60] [61] and is also necessitated by the lack of data to characterize serogroup competition. 40 As polyvalent vaccines offer protection against all meningococcal serogroups, our model describes only the circulation of one vaccine serogroup. This simplification may undermine the robustness of our model's results and its ability to project the frequency and magnitude of future meningitis epidemics, especially in the event that there is differential, serogroup-specific effectiveness of vaccines or complex between-serogroup interactions.
The vaccination strategies considered here can be compared with those we previously evaluated in a costeffectiveness study of polyvalent meningococcal vaccines in Burkina Faso. 33 This previous study concluded that for Burkina Faso, vaccination strategies that rely on the use of PMC vaccines in EPI and also within catch-up prevention vaccination campaigns can be cost-effective (with respect to the current WHO strategy). The generalizability of this conclusion to other settings of the meningitis belt, however, was unclear. The findings presented here confirm that the conclusion that PMC vaccines can be used within vaccination strategies in a cost-effective manner when compared with the current WHOrecommended strategy also appears to be the case in Niger. However, in contrast to the situation in Burkina Faso, we note that preventive strategies (i.e., Prevention 1 and 2) were found to cost more per DALY averted with respect to the status quo in Niger (Table 4 ) than with respect to the status quo in Burkina Faso. 33 While there are differences in the modeling approach between these analyses, we believe that the driving reason for the difference in the conclusion about the cost-effectiveness of the use of PMC in catch-up campaigns is that meningitis has been responsible for a far larger burden of disease in Burkina Faso (notifications of approximately 91,000 cases between 2005 and 2015) than in Niger (notifications of approximately 37,000 cases in this time period). 62 The results of these cost-effectiveness analyses in Niger and Burkina Faso indicate a need to revisit the current WHO strategy for meningitis control in sub-Saharan Africa, which relies on reactive campaigns using PMP vaccines, once affordable PMC vaccines are available. The cost-effectiveness of strategies to inform the use of PMC vaccines (e.g., to be employed in reactive v. preventive campaigns) will differ across the countries of the meningitis belt depending on the population distribution and the expected severity of meningococcal epidemics.
